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FUTURES
Market
We no longer have faith in the future. We're no longer 
even able to imagine a single future. Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger ponders a political method for an epoch 
without faith in historical destiny.
p
luralism spares nothing. The future 
too is not proof against it. As if it were 
self-evident, it is a singular noun in 
all natural languages, just like the 
past and the present, which most of us continue 
to believe only occur once. If, however, we think 
about what is in store for us, our heads grow 
dizzy. We have lost the capacity to subsume what 
is not yet there in the singular. In this sense we 
don't have too little future before us or even none 
at all, as the dusty slogan, No Future, would have 
us believe, but too much, which is to say: too 
many. The future has become unthinkable as an 
homogeneous idea. Every consideration which is 
devoted to it, splits in the manner of an endlessly 
proliferating flow diagram and brings forth a 
diversity which we can neither evade nor master.
All these possible futures compete with one another and 
rub each other's elbows raw in the crush. Presumably the 
much-lamented disappearance of utopia has its basis in this 
relativisation of the possible. It's not because nothing oc­
curs to us any more than the available projects, irrespective 
of whether utopia or dystopia appear banal to us and no 
longer binding, but because the supply of phantasms of the 
future exhausts our power of comprehension.
Futurology is the science of tea leaves. It ascribes the pat­
terns and structures which it wants to interpret to its 
material, in order to read them from it: Mars got its canals 
like this and the moon its face. This psychedelic procedure 
can rely on a tacit correspondence with our everyday ’ 
projections. It is amusing to observe that the mathematical 
term intersects with the psychoanalytic one without any­
thing dawning on either discipline.
This future pluralism has by now become part of the inte­
rior furnishing of normality. Anyone who 'thinks more than 
one day ahead'—and which of us is spared that?—un-
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avoidably develops whole series of scenarios which are 
not only incompatible with one another, but are mutually 
exclusive. The very same person, who is convinced that a 
worldwide catastrophe is imminent, signs a 30-year life 
insurance policy without batting an eyelid. The oscillation 
between Age of Aquarius and Apocalypse, New Age and 
profit calculation, nirvana and investment consultancy be­
came a mass phenomenon long ago. It's easy to poke fun 
at the crude scenarios in which superstition is at home; but 
the future has its trends whose rise and fall, even among 
people who consider themselves to be models of reason, 
would be difficult to explain rationally. Nuclear war in 
Europe, an obsessive nightmare only a few years ago, has 
as good as disappeared from the collective imagination. 
Countless versions of ecological catastrophe are evoked in 
its place. Thus the unimaginable appears as a mere varia­
tion, the extinction of the species as interchangeable play 
material.
Even the 'visions' of catastrophe obey the realisation cycle 
of the media. Their totality is specious, the finality which 
they claim makes way for others, which emerge with just 
as much exclusivity: everything will be completely dif­
ferent, because the world economy is about to break down, 
because artificial intelligence is replacing the subject, be­
cause incurable diseases will make all other catastrophes 
superfluous, because genetic engineering will put an end 
to mankind, and so on.
But pessimism cannot be trusted either. It's not only the 
monthly mortgage interest payment which presents a 
silent but tenacious reservation. The same articulate citizen 
who is convinced of the unstoppable poisoning of the 
planet, of the melting of the polar ice caps, of the exhaus­
tion of all natural resources, simultaneously holds on to the 
ideology of the technological fix and awaits the redeeming 
invention, the rescuing serum, the gentle trick which will 
solve all the energy problems once and for all.
The incompatible also exists among the experts. The 
economists can be considered the pioneers of modern for­
tune telling. For as long as anyone can remember, they've 
been solemnly providing the economy with their horo­
scopes, completely unaffected by every refutation by 
reality. The orthodox marxist calculates the day on which 
capitalism will finally collapse; in glossy brochures the 
dubious investment consultant predicts the next stock ex­
change boom. Both find a credulous public. Their prog­
noses have only one thing in common: the unshakeable 
conviction with which they are delivered. On this point the 
Club of Rome is in agreement with the nuclear power 
lobby, just as much as the climate researchers are with the 
demographers: each has put a claim on the future, his 
future.
The addressee of these efforts is on a see-saw. The media 
subject him to a constant alternation of apocalyptic and 
tranquillising slogans, and there remains little else for him 
to do, except get used to the unstable balance of panic and 
apathy. The common sense, which believes in muddling 
through, in the long run immunises itself against the in­
structions which are concealed in both positive and nega­
tive prophecies. Anyone who looks back at the future
scenarios of the 50s, 60s and 70s will have to admit that 
common sense with all its limitations has not come off any 
worse than all the think tanks of the world.
The experiences which have pulled the rug out from under 
the philosophy of history are, therefore, very tangible ones. 
The naivety of all theories—which are ultimately only 
secularised versions of the history of salvation—has be­
come blatant even for someone who has little interest in 
speculative thought. Irrespective of whether they appear 
in 'progressive' or 'conservative' guise, their self-con­
fidence has suffered greatly, and it's easy to see that they 
are now only concerned with administering their own 
assets. It is surprising and remarkable that in fact a certain 
fraction of the 'hard' sciences have new suggestions to offer 
in this situation and, precisely because it is leaving behind 
its own tradition, the dogmatism of exact calculation. There 
have been developments in thermodynamics, evolution­
ary theory, systems theory, but also in mathematics and in 
theoretical physics that could perhaps lead out of the old 
dead ends.
They are concerned with new paradigms of self organisa­
tion, with dissipative structures and non-linear logics. One 
thing at least has become clear beyond any doubt: the 
evolution of complex systems cannot, in principle, be 
precisely predicted. Their course is decisively influenced 
by singular events, often of a very high degree of im­
probability. Minute inputs can cause very large ensembles 
to collapse while, on the other hand, enormous determin­
ing variables can be dynamically absorbed without uncon­
trollable turbulences resulting. Of course, that can also be 
expressed more simply. One could say that science is well 
on the way to reinstating chance to its old metaphysical 
rights. However, nothing would be gained by regression 
to a world of pre-scientific concepts.
More interesting is the question whether such new modes 
of thinking can also be applied to social processes. Their 
inventors have nothing to say in this respect—presumably 
not only because they don't feel themselves to be com­
petent, but also because they recoil from the ideological 
implications of such a transposition. They have no interest 
in falling victim to politics. Equally, ever since their vic­
torious polemic against Social Darwinism a hundred years 
ago, sociologists and social critics take it for granted that 
there is nothing to be learned from the natural sciences. 
This prejudice long ago hardened into a leftwing ban on 
thinking.
Yet the condition of the wealthiest contemporary societies 
suggests precisely such investigations. They have aban­
doned the idea of planning. The powerful and the weak, 
individuals and groups continue to pursue their own par­
ticular goals, but the movement of the whole evades their 
designs, and even their imaginative capacity. It would not 
occur to anyone to think up a 'Five-Year Plan' and to put it 
into action, to say nothing at all of more ambitious goals. 
The idea of proposing or prescribing development plans & 
la Rostow to others, third parties (the Third World, for 
example) has also been abandoned. With that the once-so- 
favoured conspiracy theories which saw the historical 
process as guided by secretive omniscient centres have also
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been disposed of and the search for a subject of history, 
whether revolutionary or evolutionary, has proved to be 
futile.
An instance which would be capable of such central direc­
tion can no longer be discerned in these 'advanced' 
countries at all; it could even be argued that these are 
societies without leaders—that would be the ironic resur­
rection of a condition which the anthropologists believe 
they discovered among pre-historic peoples. Of course that 
is very far from meaning that power, wealth, opportunities 
would be more equally or even justly distributed in such 
an ensemble. It means only that after the dissolution of firm 
hierarchical status and class relationships an unstable, 
dynamic, fluid balance is forming, which constantly 
reproduces and changes itself without plan. Governments 
and parties in such a system have long ago ceased 'to 
determine the guidelines of politics', or even, as in the old 
physiological metaphors, to function as head, brain, central 
nervous system of the whole; they attempt, at most, to 
extend the metaphor, a kind of hormonal management, in 
order to prevent the turbulences building up into a 
catastrophe. Even this task seems too much for them 
Where they attempt to tackle the results of the unplanned 
social process frontally, they regularly fail: 'It is/ as the 
party officials then like to say, 'politically unacceptable'.
But it's not only the state whose effectiveness has declined; 
economic power too, despite, perhaps even because of its 
high degree of concentration, no longer appears, as it once 
did, monolithic and permanent. The multinational com­
panies of today are threatened to the point of bankruptcy 
by unpredictable disturbances, crises, break-downs, take­
overs, unstable patterns of ownership, sudden predatory 
raids. Just as international capital is daily moved around 
the globe in uncontrolled billion-dollar transactions, as the 
value of currencies is stochastically determined in a per­
manent electronic experiment, so economic power, too, 
embodied in a vast but fragile jellyfish, is subject to an 
unrestrained floating, a rapid sequence of rise and fall, 
growth and decay.
But in a dynamic regime that is constantly transforming 
itself there are also zones of inertia and resistance which are 
systematically underestimated by politicians and tech­
nocrats. We have seen how within the shortest space of time 
societies transform themselves right down to their seeming 
incorrigible features, right down to their collective uncon­
scious (should such a thing exist); we have, on the other 
hand, experienced how all attempts to level out their diver­
sity have failed. Limits which evade calculability are also 
placed on change. So projects to abolish bread or writing, 
for example, encounter a resistance which is difficult to 
explain but evidently tenacious; sub-systems like the so- 
called nuclear family have proved, against all expectations, 
to be extremely resistant.
This movement between acceleration and inertia, liquefac­
tion and persistence only makes the whole thing even more 
opaque. It is conceivable that such ambivalences make the 
process even more vulnerable to determining variables 
which are tiny in size, but appear at a significant moment 
and in the right place. The sudden passing of critical thresh-
holds plays an ever more important role not only in ecology 
but also in politics. Consequently an old, embarrassing 
subject, which the marxists thought had been finished off 
a long time ago, appears in a new light: the 'role of the 
individual in history'. The emergence of a Khomeini or a 
Pol Pot can cost millions of people their head; if an en­
lightened Tsar appears, the consequences are unforesee­
able; if a madman should move into the White House, then 
we wouldn't need to go on worrying our heads about the 
future of pension systems; and we don't dare to think what 
would happen if a brilliant founder of a religious sect got 
control of the media. Even someone who still enjoys put­
ting forward theses about the future must realise that every 
single one of then can at any time be upset by a minimal 
factor x, which triggers the flash point
Most of us will probably find it quite easy to put up with 
the end of the philosophy of history. But that does not mean 
that we could get by without perspectives for our lives, 
strategies, 'plans'. The result is that the scissors between 
theoretical understanding and the practice of life must 
open ever wider. If there is some truth to what I have tried 
(fairly casually) to suggest here, then there follows from 
that a behaviour which can no longer claim any general 
obligatoriness: each person is left to pursue his own con­
jectures, and even they are subject to an unspoken reserva­
tion: I act as if, among all the continuously oscillating 
futures, I could find my own.
At the risk of it being confused with a confession I would 
like to state such a conjecture. I believe the flexibility which 
is demanded and praised on all sides and which is gradual­
ly being elevated to the status of a cardinal social virtue, to 
be a bad strategy. The mere social automaton, who always 
only responds to current situations, not only loses the last 
remnant of control over his own fate, he will always also 
arrive too late. The hedgehog's contempt for the hare, who 
is always panting behind him, is certain, but the opposite 
solution is also worth less every day. Anyone who believes 
that what matters is to assault 'the system' frontally, as a 
conservative or a revolutionary warrior, succumbs—if my 
description is not mistaken—to an illusion; because such 
an attitude is only then meaningful if one disposes of an 
objectively stringent perspective for the future (knows 'the 
meaning of history').
The question whether it's best to swim with the current or 
against it seems to me out of date because it presupposes 
an untenable simplification. The method of the yachtsman 
who tacks with the wind as well as against it seems more 
fruitful. Such a procedure applied to society demands stoic 
disbelief and the greatest attentiveness. Anyone who wants 
to reach even the nearest goal must expect, step by step, a 
thousand unpredictable variables and cannot put his trust 
in any of them. But presence of mind alone is not enough. 
No one who wants to escape the idiocy of synchronicity 
can afford to be afraid of anachronism. A certain degree of 
obstinacy which renounces last proofs can do no harm.
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